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ARGUME~T 
Plaintiff/Appellee C504750P, LLC c·Plaintiff') tries desperately in its brief to avoid 
the relevant issues that require reversal of the trial court's default judgment to be set aside. 
First, it asserts that Defendant/ Appellant Staci Baker c·Mrs. Baker") failed to preserve two 
of the three issues she asserts on appeal: that (I) Mrs. Baker has a meritorious defense, and 
\vas thus entitled to have the ddault judgment set aside~ and (2) the trial court erred in 
a\varding attorney fees. Plaintiff is wrong. As discussed belovv, Mrs. Baker specifically 
preserved both issues. 
Plaintiff also tries to avoid the third issue-that service by publication is 
constitutionally deficient, because there \Vere other means of service available-by 
attempting to change the issue to whether alternative service was justified. However, as has 
been plainly stated, Mrs. Baker does not contest on appeal whether alternative service was 
justified. This appeal is about whether the particular method of alternative service ordered 
was constitutionally sound. In keeping with this charade, Plaintiff goes so far as to assert in 
its .. Constitutional or Statutory Provisions" section that it .. does not believe there is a 
constitutional provision which is directly relevant or material to this appeal." Appellee 's 
Brief at l. When Plaintiff finally gets around to addressing publication, it boldly asserts that 
.. publication through a newspaper was a likely means to inform Defendant of the lawsuit." 
Id. at 27. Mrs. Baker will discuss why this assertion, directly contrary to United States 
Supreme Court precedent, Utah Supreme Court precedent, and common sense, is also 
unsupported by any fact in this case. 
I. MRS. BAKER PRESERVED ALL ISSUES SHE HAS RAISED ON APPEAL. 
In order to avoid having to deal with ( l) the caselaw requiring default judgments to 
be set aside in the presence of a meritorious defense, and (2) the plain error in awarding 
attorney fees in the absence of a contract authorizing such a remedy, Plaintiff asserts that 
Mrs. Baker failed to preserve either of these issues. ln support of this fiction, Plaintiff 
represents that the sole basis for relief asserted by Mrs. Baker in her motion to set aside the 
judgement was that ··the default judgment was ·void' for lack of service pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(4)." Appellee's Brief at 13. Plaintiff made the same representation to the trial court 
below· in an effort to get the trial court to disregard the other bases supporting relief, which 
it asserts were raised for the first time in Mrs. Baker's reply memorandum. R. 292 
(""Defendant. in her Initial Memorandum, claimed only that the default judgment was void 
and, therefore, sought relief from the default judgment on the basis that the judgment was 
void due to lack ofservic~ under Rule 60(b)(4)."); R. 365 c·As we have set forth in our 
motion to strike and in fact in our memorandum in opposition. the only issue raised in this 
motion was that the service was void."). 1 Plaintiff was wrong then and it is wrong now. 
As an initial matter. Mrs. Baker did not cite only Rule 60(b )( 4 ). as represented by 
Plaintiff. ln fact, her motion did not cite any specific subsection of the rule. It did, however, 
discuss more than one subsection, R. 129, and plainly set forth both arguments Plaintiff 
represents were not raised. With respect to attorney fees, Mrs. Baker argued: '"Moreover, 
there is no basis or evidence for award and attorneys' fees when Mrs. Baker never signed any 
1 The trial court never ruled on this issue. R. 372-373; R. 328-331; and R. 332-333. 
2 
document providing for the recovery of attorneys' fees and there is no basis under the law 
for which attorneys' fees should be awarded. (Utah R. Civ. P. 73)." R. 131 (Memorandum 
in Support of Defendant's Motion for Relief from Default Judgment) at n. l. With respect 
to the meritorious defense, Mrs. Baker then argued in her moving memorandum: 
Jd.2 
Similarly, there is no basis for the award of title to the Property considering the 
appraised value of the Property of $124,000.00 and the purported purchase 
price of $15,000.00 for which the Plaintiff purchased the Property from a 
relative ( everything about this transaction appears to be an effort to 
fraudulently deprive Mrs. Baker of her interest in the Property). 
Plaintiffs effort to ignore these arguments began immediately. In its memorandum 
in opposition, Plaintiff cited an email from Mrs. Baker's husband, which set forth the 
meritorious defense. However, Plaintiff quoted only selectively from the email, leaving out 
any mention of Mr. Baker's concerns over the illegitimate nature of the transaction. Plaintiff 
2 Plaintiff notes on appeal that ··Defendant acknowledged in her memorandum in 
support of her Motion to Set Aside that· [b ]ecause it is not appropriate on Rule 60(b) motions 
to examine the merits of the claim, [Defendant] will reserve briefing all issues that go to the 
merits of the claim and award sought by Plaintiff.,.. Appellee Brief at 19. Meritorious 
defense arguments. however, do not seek to resolve the merits of a dispute, despite their 
nomenclature. Rather, a defendant is entitled to have a default judgment set aside if it can 
establish that an issue has sufficient color at least to be tried. See Men=ies v. Galetka, 2006 
UT 81, ~ I 08. 150 P .3d 480 (""A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a default 
judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried.") (quoting Erickson v. Schenkers Intern. 
Forivarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994)). Indeed, Plaintiffs overly narrow 
reading of the caselaw limiting Rule 60(b) review from any consideration of the case's 
underlying merits would eviscerate the entire body of caselaw holding that defendants are 
generally ··entitled'' to have a default judgment set aside where a meritorious defense exists. 
See. e.g., Aspenbrook Homemvners Ass 'n v. Dahl, 2014 UT App 99, i110, 329 P.3d 822,826 
cert. denied sub nom. Aspenbrook v. Dahl, 337 P.3d 295 (Utah 2014) ('"Generally, 'a movant 
is entitled to have a default judgment set aside under [rule] 60(b) [ of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure] if ... the movant has alleged a meritorious defense.") (citations omitted). 
3 
thus stated, referring to a letter it had sent requesting Mrs. Baker's presence at the closing 
scheduled for the transaction: 
On July 31, 2014, Defendant responded to this letter via email. The email 
stated that "I am providing the following on behalf of my wife Staci Baker 
regarding the tax sale property at 16 l W. Paci fie Ori ve in American [F]ork." 
He continued, stating that he '"will not be cooperating with [PlaintiffJ on the 
proposed sale of the tax sale home at 161 Pacific Drive in American Fork." 
He finally stated that he ••intend[s] to pursue collection of these lost rents in 
any legal proceedings that become necessary. Conduct yourselves accordingly, 
Staci Baker." 
R. 193 at ~I 7. 
By selectively quoting the email, Plaintiff attempted to avoid dealing with the 
following language regarding the meritorious defense: 
I am quite confident that the ·sale' referenced in the tax sale statute was never 
intended to refer to a process in which the original owner who had lost interest 
in the property was able to cheat the tax sale interest purchaser out of their 
[sic] statutorily defined return by selling the property to a related party in a 
non-arm's length transaction and at a very steep discount from fair market 
value. Furthermore, I am strongly convinced you would have a difficult time 
selling that interpretation to a judge. If you would like to put the property up 
for sale and sell it at fair market value then [ would not oppose the sale. 
Unless and until such time, I oppose the sale and will not cooperate with it. 
However, if Mr [sic] Collings believes his 'sale' represents the property"s fair 
value, then l would happily agree to purchase the property for $15, l 00 and buy 
Mr. Collings out of his interest. 
R. 235-36. 
Mrs. Baker, of course, pointed out this omission in her reply memorandum, where she 
expounded upon the arguments she first raised in her moving memorandum. With respect 
to the meritorious defense. Mrs. Baker argued: 
Such a disparity in the appraised value of the Property [$124,000] and the 
purchase price [$15,000] in the REPC, under which the Property was sold to 
4 
a relative in a non-ann' s length transaction at the expense of Defendant, Mrs. 
Baker, calls into question the entire transaction contemplated by the REPC, if 
not the integrity of the Plaintiff and the seller under the REPC. A case with 
such facts is the precise reason for Rule 60(b rs catchall language which 
allmvs the Court .. upon such terms as arc just'· and in the .. furtherance of 
justice .. to relieve a party from final judgment based on any of the reasons set 
forth therein, including ··any other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment." Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
R. 229-30. ~frs. Baker also expounded upon her attorney fees argument: 
The av.:ard of attorneys' fees against Stacie Baker is also unjust. In Utah an 
a\vard of attorneys' fees can be made if a statute provides for such an award 
or a contract between the parties provides for such an award. IHC Health 
Services v. D&K 1Hanagement, 2008 UT 73, ii 39, 196 P.3d 588. The basis for 
attorneys' fees stated in the judgment is section 17 of the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract. That \Vas not a contract bet\veen Plaintiff and Mrs. Baker, and Mrs. 
Baker is not a signatory to that contract. Therefore, there \vas no basis for an 
a\vard of attorneys· fees and the judgment should be set aside. 
R. 229. 
In short. Mrs. Baker preserved the meritorious defense and attorney foes issues, in 
addition to the constitutionally ddicient service issue, for appeal by squarely presenting the 
issues to the trial court for decision. See Prau \'. 1Velsv11, 2007 UT 41, ~I 15, 164 P.3d 366 
( citations omitted) c·Generally, · in order to preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be 
presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that 
issue."'). 
Accordingly, the case law Plaintiff cites holding that a party may not rely on 60(b )( 6)'s 
catchall provision ••if the asserted grounds for relief fall within any other subsection of rule 
5 
60(b)," Appellee's Brief at 16 (citations omitted), is inapposite here, as Mrs. Baker's motion 
to set aside the judgment was based on three independent errors, two of which fall within the 
rule's catchall provision. 
11. MRS. BAKER DID NOT ABANDO~ ANY BASIS FOR RELIEF DURI~G 
ORAL ARGUMENT. 
Plaintiffs effort to avoid the meritorious defense and attorney fees issues does not 
stop with its argument about preservation. Apparently feeling the need to have a backup to 
this unfounded argument. Plaintiff also represents that Mrs. Baker abandoned these t\VO 
issues during her oral argument on the motion to set aside (an assertion necessarily premised 
on an admission that the issues had, in fact, been raised to begin with). Plaintiff represents: 
--ouring oral argument, Defendant effectively abandoned such other arguments and only 
argued that the defaultjudgment was void because of failure of service (i.e., pursuant to Rule 
60tb)(4 ))." Appellee Brief at 18. In suppo1t of this representation, Plaintiff cites R. 342-373: 
that is, the entire hearing transcript save the caption and appearance pages, as well as the 
index. There is a reason Plaintiff does not cite to any specific excerpt of the transcript to 
support its representation: none exists. Rather, the transcript of the hearing is replete with 
argument from Mrs. Baker·s counsel in support of both issues. 
For example, with respect to the meritorious defense, Mrs. Baker's counsel argued: 
··on November 26th of 2014 this court entered a default judgment against Staci Baker which 
in essence sanctioned an insider transaction that deprived Ms. Baker of 40%), her 40% 
interest in a home \vorth about $124,000 in exchange for which she only received $5,000, at 
6 
least in the judgment." R. 343 at lines 4: 16-20. Counsel returned to this issue later in his 
argument: 
But that is the insider transaction. Those are the same people. That's Mr. 
Collings (phonetic) and his son is on the other transaction, Mr. Collings 
{phonetic). So you've got Mr. Collings (phonetic) and his son on both sides of 
this transaction where they, they sell this property for $15,000 instead of what 
it was worth. 
R. 345 at lines 6: 19-25. 
\Vith respect to attorney fres. Mrs. Baker's counsel argued: ·~But there was no basis 
for attorney· s fees as to ~frs. Baker because she never signed a contract which would allow 
them to take attorney's fees, nor did she, nor is there a statute which would allow that." R. 
343-44 at lines 4:24-5:2. At the close of his argument, counsel stated: .. And then l just 
emphasize again that we've got this problem of an attorney's fee award that there's no basis 
for." R. 357 at lines 18:9-11. 
In short, just as there is no factual basis to support Plaintiffs representation that Mrs. 
Baker failed to preserve all appellate issues, there is no factual basis to support its 
representation that Mrs. Baker abandoned these issues at oral argument. Rather, the record 
directly refutes Plaintiffs representations. 3 
III. MRS. BAKER'S MERITORIOUS DEFENSE E~TITLED HER TO HAVE 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SET ASIDE . 
.a Plaintiff argues in its brief that .. Utah's Partial Interest Tax Purchaser statute mandates 
that a person who purchases an undivided interest of less than 491% at a tax sale "may not 
3 Plaintiff did not raise any objection to these arguments at the hearing, nor did it press 
for a ruling on its motion to strike these arguments, which it had alleged, erroneously, were 
made for the first time in Mrs. Baker's reply memorandum. 
7 
object' to a subsequent sale by the majority property owner." Appellee Brief at 12 (quoting 
Utah Code § 59-2-1351. 7). Mrs. Baker takes no issue with this assertion; however, 
Plaintiffs argument merely begs the question of what the legislature meant by sale. Plaintiff 
would argue that the word sale includes an inside deal with a close relative at a reverse-
engineered price far below its actual market value. Mrs. Baker submits that it would not. 
Plaintiff quotes State v. Anderson, 2007 UT App 304, 169 P.3d 778, for the 
proposition that the court's ···task is to interpret the words used by the legislature, not to 
correct or revise them."' Id. at iI l l (quoting State v. Wallace, 2006 UT 86, 19, 150 P.3d 
540). Mrs. Baker could not agree more. The question becomes which party's interpretation 
most faithfully adheres to the common, ordinary, and reasonable meaning of sale, and which 
seeks to interpret the term in a way foreign to common understanding. See Hutter v. Dig-It, 
Inc., 2009 UT 69, ~I 32, 219 P.3d 918 (""When interpreting a statute, we assume, absent a 
contrary indication, that the legislature used each tenn advisedly according to its ordinary and 
usually accepted meaning."). Mrs. Baker submits that interpreting sale to include sham 
inside transactions reflects neither the ordinary nor usually accepted meaning of the word. 
The unreasonableness of Plaintiffs interpretation is reflected in the unreasonableness 
of its actions surrounding the sale. After reverse-engineering the price, Mrs. Baker's 
husband demanded that, if Plaintiff \Vere interested in selling the property, that it list the 
property on the market where it's fair market value could be obtained. R. 235-36. Mr. 
Baker further offered that if Plaintiff truly believed $15,000 truly represented the property's 
fair market value, he '·would happily agree to purchase the property for $15, l 00 and buy 
8 
[Plaintiff] out of his interest." R. 235-36. Plaintiff, of course, ignored this offer, as it was 
never its interest to sell the property; only to rid Mrs. Baker from title as inexpensively as 
possible. 
Finally, it must be remembered that to mount a meritorious defense, a defendant need 
not prove its case but only show that its defense is entitled to be heard and tried. Nfen=ies v. 
Galerka, 2006 UT 81. •j 108, 150 P.Jd 480 (""A defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a 
default judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried.'') ( quoting Erickson v. Schenkers In rem. 
Fonrnrders. Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, l 149 (Utah 1994)). Plaintiff never even attempted to 
distinguish this caselaw or its application to this case, seeking instead to try to avoid this 
issue completely by arguing it was not preserved. 
IV. MRS. BAKER'S MERITORIOUS DEFENSE IS BASED ONLY ON MATTERS 
PROPERLY CO~TAI~ED I~ THE RECORD. 
An appdlate court's .. review is "limited to the evidence contained in the record on 
appeal."' Shurtle_ffl'. United Ejjbrr Plan Trust, :w12 UT 47, '16 n.4, 289 P.3d 408 (citations 
omitted). Plaintiff argues that ~lrs. Baker· s assertions regarding .. the value of the property 
and the circumstances of the sale are not factually supported by the record." Appellee·s Brief 
at 33 (emphasis in original). Plaintiff asserts that this defense was not properly raised or 
preserved below," because Mrs. Baker's ··conclusory value assertions (i.e., that the value of 
the property was $140,000) in her Reply Memorandum were unverified and inadmissible and 
must be disregarded on appeal (as in the District Court)." Id. 
As an initial matter, Plaintiff did not argue that Mrs. Baker's value assertions (an 
appraisal) were unverified or inadmissible in any of its papers below. R. 191-223 (Plaintiffs 
9 
memorandum in opposition to Mrs. Baker's motion to set aside defaultjudgment); R 288-289 
(Plaintiffs motion to strike portions of Mrs. Baker's reply memorandum); R 290-295 
(Plaintiffs memorandum in support of its motion to strike); R. 306-311 (Plaintiffs reply 
memorandum in support of its motion to strike). Nor did Plaintiff object to the introduction 
of this testimony at the hearing on the motions. R. 342-3 73. 
tvloreover, like the other issues Plaintiff represents were raised for the first time in 
Mrs. Baker"s reply memorandum. Plaintiffs representation that Mrs. Baker's value assertion 
was raised for the first time in her reply memorandum has no basis in fact. Indeed. Mrs. 
Baker squarely asserted the property's value ($124.000, not $140,000) in her memorandum 
in support of her motion to set aside the judgment. R. 127 at~ 12 (''A retrospective appraisal 
of the Property resulted in an appraised value of $124,000.00 (the 'Appraisal') (See 
Appraisal attached hereto as Exhibit D).'') (emphasis in original). Mrs. Baker also discussed 
the appraised value in her reply memorandum, R. 229 C"Ho\'vever, the appraised value of the 
Property is $124,000.00 (Exhibit C to Defendant's Memorandum. also attached hereto as 
Exhibit ·c )"), as well as at the hearing, R. 3-+3, again without objection. Thus, there is no 
m~rit to Plaintiffs argument that Mrs. Baker relied on matters not ofrecord in support of her 
meritorious defense.-4 
V. THE COURT ERRED I~ A\VARDING ATTOR~EY FEES. 
Further explaining why Plaintiff is desperate to argue Mrs. Baker failed to preserve 
certain issues-desperate enough to make representations that have no basis in fact-is that 
4 Ironically, as discussed below, in section VI, it is Plaintiff, not Mrs. Baker, that has 
relied on matters not of record. 
10 
. J 
Plaintiff can offer no justification for the trial court's award of attorney fees, or Plaintiffs 
decision to put such an award into its proposed form of order submitted to the trial court. 
There being no basis for an award ofattomey fees in this case, Plaintiff led the trial court into 
committing plain error. Plaintiff makes no attempt whatever in its brief to justify its actions 
or the unfounded award. lnstead, its only defense is to try to convince this Court not even 
to consider the issue. The fact remains, however. that the issue was properly preserved-in 
1\lrs. Baker's moving memorandum, in her reply memorandum, and at the hearing. Once 
brought to the trial court's attention, this egregious error alone should have caused the trial 
court to set aside its judgment. The trial court's refusal to do so must be corrected. 
VI. SERVICE BY PUBLICA TIO~ \VAS IMPROPER IN THIS CASE. 
Presumably trying to raise a strawman it can knock down, Plaintiff devotes most of 
its brief relating to service by publication to arguing that alternative service was justified. 
As Mrs. Baker has repeatedly made clear, however, she is not challenging the trial court's 
factual detennination that alterative service was justified. She is challenging the trial court's 
legal detennination that publication was an appropriate means of altemati ve service in light 
of United States Supreme Court precedent (Mu!lant: v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 
U.S. 306 ( 1950)) and Utah Supreme Court precedent ( Graham v. Smmya, 632 P.2d 851, 
853-54 (Utah 1981 )) to the contrary . 
In an attempt to side-step this precedent, Plaintiff argues that Mrs. Baker's reliance 
on Alullane is misplaced. Plaintiff asserts that Mrs. Baker ""ignores Utah case law directly 
on point." Appellee's Brief at 22 ... In Jackson Const. Co., Inc. v. 1Harrs, 2004 UT 89, ~J 11, 
11 
100 P.3d 1211, 12 l 5," it argues, "the Utah Supreme Court made clear that Utah courts satisfy 
the due process concerns outlined in Mullane by first requiring a plaintiff to exercise 
reasonable due diligence in attempting to locate and serve a defendant before alternative 
service by publication may be sought or allowed." Id. This assertion is misleading. Jackson 
Construction is actually fatal to Plaintiffs position. 
While Jackson Construction held that '"litigants may not resort to service by 
publication until they have first undertaken reasonably diligent efforts to locate the party to 
be served," Jackson Const. at ~l 11, Mrs. Baker does not argue on appeal that Plaintiff failed 
to meet this requirement. After all, there was no need for Plaintiff to locate Mrs. Baker; it 
knew where she lived and had already communicated regarding these matters with her 
husband, who was acting in her behalf, via email. Moreover, although the evidence 
presented to the trial court strongly refutes any notion that Mrs. Baker was attempting to 
evade service of process,5 Mrs. Baker does not contest on appeal that it was reasonable for 
the trial court to order alternative service after five failed service attempts. Rather, the issue 
is whether service by publication to the exclusion ofall other known means of service readily 
5 Among other things, evidence presented to the trial court established that: ( 1) the 
front room of Mrs. Baker's residence was converted by her husband as an office; (2) Mr. 
Baker had instructed his assistant, who worked at this office, not to answer the front door, 
as anyone coming to the front door would be there for personal reasons; (3) Mr. Baker also 
maintained a legally confirming apartment in his residence and had tenants living there 
during the relevant time; ( 4) Mrs. Baker, who was five months pregnant with twins during 
this time, was not home very often due to complications she was experiencing with her 
pregnancy; (5) the Bakers eventually lost the twins, and in aftermath fell behind for a time 
in many of life's administrative tasks, such as reviewing mail. R. 285-87. 
12 
l 
available was constitutionally permissible-the actual due process concern addressed by 
Mullane. 
Moreover, Jackson Construction did not hold that service by publication is 
appropriate in all circumstances so long as the litigant satisfies the diligent efforts 
requirement. Indeed, the facts of Jackson Construction did not concern Mu/lane's factual 
scenario where a defendant was served exclusively by publication even though the defendant 
--could [have] easily be[ en] informed by other means at hand."' Alu/lane, 339 U.S. at 318-19. 
Rather, Jackson Construction reiterated A,/u/la11e·s .. recognition that publication alone is 
generally not a reliable means of informing interested parties that their rights are at issue 
before the court.,. Jackson Const. at •j 11 ( citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315) ( emphasis 
added). Based on this recognition, and still following Mu/lane's precedent, it then reiterated 
that even where .. alternative service is authorized, it must be ·reasonably calculated, under 
all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the action to the 
extent reasonably possible or practicable."' See Jackson Const. at ~j 22 ( quoting 339 U.S. at 
31-4 ). Based on this precedent, the Court concluded that service by publication in the Jackson 
Construction case \Vas --functionally equivalent to rolling up the summons. shoving it into 
a bottle. and throwing it into the ocean." Id. at ~I 22. 
Despite the universal recognition that service by publication is not likely to apprise 
anyone of anything. Plaintiff argues that Mrs. Baker's ··position that alternative service by 
publication was not calculated to provide her notice is disingenuous." Id. at ~I 27. To support 
this incredible assertion, Plaintiff cites facts not contained in the record but invented by 
13 
Plaintiff: for example, that Mrs. Baker learned about the tax sale from reading the newspaper. 
Because Mrs. Baker learned about the tax sale in the newspaper, the argument goes, she 
would likely have also seen the legal notice regarding the complaint filed against her. 
Putting aside the giant leap this argument requires the Court to make (that is; because 
l\frs. Baker saw one notice on one occasion she would have seen all other notices on all other 
occasions), there is nothing in the record actually establishing that Mrs. Baker learned of the 
tax sale in this fashion or that she even reads the newspaper. Nor is there anything in the 
record that even hints that publication in the newspaper is the only way the county notices 
tax sales. 
Not to be hampered by this or the prohibition of citing matters not ofrecord, Shurtleff~ 
20 I 2 UT 4 7 at ~I 6 n.4, Plaintiff cites to the Utah County website to show that notice of tax 
sales are published in The Dai~v Herald. The problem with this, of course, is the reason this 
information is not in the record is because it was not raised below. Had it been, Mrs. Baker 
\vould have had the opportunity to point to the other methods Utah County uses to publish 
notice of tax sales. \vhich Plaintiff omits from its argument. and establish the means she 
actually used to discover the sale. Regardless. Plaintiffs conclusory argument should be 
given only the weight to \vhich it is entitled-nothing. The fact is, like Jackson and virtually 
every other case, serving Mrs. Baker by running a legal notice in the newspaper was akin to 
putting a note in a bottle and throwing it out to sea. 
In sum, service by publication in this case, where Plaintiff had other means of service 
(mail and email) readily available to it, simply does not pass constitutional muster. Because 
1-l 
(I) ""[a] lack of [personal jurisdiction] is fatal to a court's authority to decide a case with 
respect to a particular litigant;" (2) ·•[f]or a court to acquire jurisdiction, there must be a 
proper issuance and service of summons; and (3) .. An elementary and fundamental 
requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice 
reasonably calculated. under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections," Jackson 
Const. 2004 UT 80 at ~l~i 7 ( citation omitted. second alteration in Jackson Const.), the trial 
court in this case never obtained proper jurisdiction over Mrs. Baker and its judgment must 
be set aside. 
Rule 4 's general allowance to serve by publication under certain circumstances does 
not trump this precedent nor the constitutional requirement that publication may not be 
invoked except when there is no other possible means of service. As the Utah Supreme 
Court ruled 35 years ago: ""Even [ where publication is justified generally]. however, 
publication is not a constitutionally acceptable means of notice of the pendency of litigation 
where • it is not reasonably calculated to reach those who could easily be informed by other 
means at hand."' Graham v. Sawaya, 632 P.2d 85 l, 853-54 (Utah 198 l) (quoting Alu/lane, 
339 U.S. at 319). 
VII. THE COURT SHOULD A WARD ATTOR.~EY FEES TO MRS. BAKER. 
Plain ti ff should be sanctioned for filing a frivolous brief containing multiple 
misstatements of material fact. Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures provides 
that if either party files a frivolous brief, the Court ··shall award just damages," including 
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reasonable attorney fees to the aggrieved party. Utah R. App. P. 33(a). The rule defines a 
frivolous brief as ·~one that is not grounded in fact .... '' Id. at 33(b ). The rule states that the 
Court ·'may award damages upon request of any party ... as part of a party's response to a 
motion or other paper." Id. at 33(c)( l ). A party against whom damages are sought is entitled 
to a hearing on the matter: Id. at 33( c )(3 ). 
Appellee's brief is not grounded in fact. To the contrary, the briefs principal 
arguments are supported by assertions contrary to the facts of this case. For example: 
1. Plain ti ff s assertions that there is no ··constitutional provision which is directly 
relevant or material to this appeal, " Appellee 's Brief at l, ignores the fact that one of the 
principal arguments advanced by Mrs. Baker, and the only argument squarely addressed by 
Plaintiff: is that service in this case was constitutionally deficient under the Due Process 
clauses of the United States and Utah Constitutions;0 
2. Plaintiffs representation that Mrs. Baker failed to raise the meritorious defense 
and attorney fees issues in her moving memorandum, is false and refuted by the record; 
3. Plaintiff's similar representation that Mrs. Baker's moving memorandum cited 
only Rule 60{b )(-+ ), \vhen in fact Mrs. Baker's memorandum did not cit~ any specific 
subsection. including 60{b)(4). is false and refuted by the record: 
4. Plaintiff's representation that Mrs. Baker abandoned the meritorious dd'ense 
and attorney fees issues at oral argument, is false and refuted by the record; 
6 lt is astonishing that Plaintiff could assert that no constitutional provision is relevant 
to this appeal when it itself discusses due process at pages 16, 21 (twice), 22 (four times), 23, 
and 28 (""In sum, [Mrs. Baker] was properly served in accordance with appropriate due 
process considerations .... '"). 
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5. Plaintiffs representation that Mrs. Baker's property value assertion was not 
part of the record but raised for the first time in her reply memorandum, is false and refuted 
by the record; 
6. Plaintiff asserts that the Utah Supreme Court, in Jackson Construction, '·made 
clear that Utah courts satisfy the due process concerns outlined in Mullane by [satisfying the 
diligent efforts requirement]," when the due process concerns actually discussed in Mullane 
had nothing to do with efforts to find defendants but the prohibition of serving defendants 
whose location was already known exclusively by publication. 
Had Plaintiff made only one minor misrepresentation, or two, Mrs. Baker would not 
think to seek fees under Rule 33. But when Plaintiff makes three, four, five, and even six, 
material misrepresentations, it submits that an award of fees under the rule is in order. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in her opening brief, Mrs. 
Baker respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial court's decision to deny relief to 
Mrs. Baker under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and remand this action to 
the trial court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 13:h day of June. 2016. 
HOOLE & KING, LC. 
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